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The Brazilian Navy is unique among most world navies 
today.  Since the end of the Cold War, most nations have 
reduced their naval power, yet Brazil has maintained a 
determination to possess a blue-water fleet.  Brazil is 
also attempting to assert itself as the regional power in 
South America, in this case through the development of a 
modern yet modest naval force capable of projecting power 
beyond its shores.  
This thesis seeks to explore Brazil’s recent naval 
expansion through three points of view.  First, Brazil is 
seeking possession of a blue water naval force as a likely 
means for it to achieve greater power and prestige amongst 
other powerful states in the world.  Second, Brazil aspires 
for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council, and is expanding its fleet to increase its chances 
of being chosen. Finally, domestic politics also have a 
great effect on Brazil’s current drive to blue water.  
Creation of the civilian-led defense ministry, the 
expensive SIVAM surveillance system, and general public 
sentiment all work to favor naval expansion. 
The thesis concludes by summarizing the three 
arguments and stating that each of the three arguments have 
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My interest in the Brazilian Navy was sparked by a 
suggestion by Dr. Trinkunas in mid 2004.  After shortly 
thereafter discovering through preliminary research that 
Brazil’s Navy had replaced its World War II-era aircraft 
carrier with the former French carrier Foch, I realized 
that this was the subject I wished to write on. 
I wish to sincerely thank Dr. Trinkunas and Dr. Hagan 
for their guidance throughout the course of my research, 
and their expert review of my prose.  Their devotion to my 
success made my job much easier. 
I would also like to thank my fiancée, Sandra, for her 
loving support and patience with me as I took time away 
from her to conduct the research and writing needed to 




































Sail on, O Ship of State! 
Sail on, O Union, strong and great! 
Humanity with all its fears, 
With all the hopes of future years, 
Is hanging breathless on thy fate! 
  -Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Building of the Ship 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the past five years, the Brazilian Navy has been 
undergoing what could be considered a rebirth – a rebirth 
that if seen to conclusion would result in a naval force 
more capable of “blue-water” (i.e. away from the littoral, 
coastal regions and home waters) operations.  Funding for 
the Navy has been increased, new shipbuilding and 
acquisition programs introduced, and additional units have 
been added to the fleet through foreign procurement.  In a 
region that has enjoyed relative stability with respect to 
interstate relations, the current Brazilian drive to 
develop a blue water force seems an aberration in the Latin 
America. 
Brazil has a long and proud naval tradition that began 
prior to the country’s independence in 1822.  Brazil served 
as the main base for the Portuguese Navy following the 
invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by Napoleon in 1807, and 
thus developed an indigenous shipbuilding industry to 
support it.1  Later, after Brazilian independence and 
throughout the 19th century, when Brazil was an imperial 
monarchy, the Navy was involved in numerous operations, 
including three separate conflicts with Uruguay.  In World 
War I, Brazil declared war on Germany in 1917, after 
                     
1
 Domingos P.C.B. Ferreira, The Navy of Brazil: An Emerging Power at 
Sea, Washington, National Defense University Press: 1983, 6. 
2 
repeated U-Boat attacks against its merchantmen; the 
Brazilian Navy was subsequently used in the South Atlantic, 
patrolling the African coast.2  Similarly, World War II saw 
Brazil again operating against Germany in the South 
Atlantic. 
By the 1980s, Brazil was one of only two nations in 
Latin America to have an aircraft carrier, the former 
British light carrier Minas Gerais (Argentina had the 
other, which was in such poor material condition by 1990 
that it was withdrawn from service).  Despite the limited 
utility of Minas Gerais and a law forbidding the Navy from 
possessing the fixed wing aircraft capable of operating 
from the ship,3 Brazil persisted with maintaining the 
expensive carrier, upgrading it constantly and neglecting 
other units of the fleet.4  The other ships in service at 
the time were mostly used destroyers inherited from the 
United States as well as some modern frigates. 
B. CURRENT STATE OF THE BRAZILIAN NAVY 
The Brazilian fleet today remains a hodgepodge of 
vessels, most handed down from other countries, and more 
recently, including some indigenously constructed units.  
In 1998, the long-standing rule governing naval aviation 
was finally done away with, clearing the way for the 
purchase in the same year of 23 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft from 
Kuwait.5  The Skyhawk is a light attack aircraft originally 
designed for operation from aircraft carriers, and thus 
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 Serviço de Relações Públicas de Marinha and Carlos Lorch, The 
Brazilian Navy: Naval Power, Rio de Janeiro: Action Editora Ltda., 
1997, 32-33. 
3




 Anonymous, “Brazil establishes naval aviation,” in Military 
Technology 22, February, 1998, 59. 
3 
gave Brazil its first ever carrier-borne attack aircraft.  
Two years later, Brazil bought the former French carrier 
Foch, renaming it São Paulo, for about $42 million,6 and 
replacing the Minas Gerais, which had been in Brazilian 
service for 41 years.7 
The table on the following page shows the current 
status of the Brazilian fleet, and including the country of 
origin of the various major units.  Original class names 
are included, where applicable.  Large units such as 
frigates and the carrier São Paulo tend to come from 
overseas sources, though they are not limited to these, as 
evidenced by the Niterói class, the last two ships of which 
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 J.A.C. Lewis, “France sells Foch carrier to Brazil,” in Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, August 30, 2000. 
7
 Schleiffert, Rob and Corné Rodenburg, “Sao Paulo Rules the Waves,” 
in Naval Aviation News, September-October 2003, 15. 
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Table 1.   The Brazilian Navy Order of Battle (2005) 
 
Type    Class (Original Name)  Number Country of Origin 
Aircraft Carrier (CV)  São Paulo   1 France 
Frigate (FF)   Greenhalgh (Broadsword) 3 United Kingdom 
Frigate (FF)   Niterói    6 United Kingdom8/Brazil 
Frigate (FF)   Pará (Garcia)   1 United States 
Corvette (FSGH)  Barroso    (1)9 Brazil 
Corvette (FSGH)  Inháuma    4 Brazil 
Submarine (SS)   Tikuna    (1)10 Brazil 
Submarine (SS)   Tupi (Type 209)  4 Germany11/Brazil 
Amphibious Ship, Dock (LSD) Ceará (Thomaston)  2 United States 
Amphibious Ship, Tank (LST) Mattoso Maia (Newport)  1 United States 
Replenishment Tanker (AOR) Marajo    1 Brazil 
Replenishment Tanker (AOR) Almirante Gastão Motta  1 Brazil 
     Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships12 
The table shows that Brazil is swiftly moving towards 
indigenous shipbuilding, especially in the area of 
submarines and small surface combatants.  The Tupi-class 
submarines and Inhauma-class corvettes, for example, are 
all modern units, and are built domestically.  In addition 
to the new carrier acquired from France, the new frigates 
acquired from Great Britain are highly capable anti-
submarine escorts, and are used to screen the São Paulo.   
The submarine program in particular warrants specific 
mention, as Brazil has long desired to construct a nuclear 
submarine.  Brazil is the only state in Latin America 
capable of building submarines on its own, and has already 
                     
8
 These ships are of a British design, and were built to order 
initially by yards in England, then the last two units were built in 
Brazil. 
9
 The first unit of the Barroso class was under construction in 
Brazil as of this writing. 
10
 The Tikuna is a new design under construction in Brazil, and 
according to Jane’s Fighting Ships is viewed as an “intermediate step” 
prior to building a nuclear submarine. 
11
 First unit completed in Germany, the remainder were built in yards 
in Brazil. 
12
 Jane’s Fighting Ships Online, found at: http://www.janes.com. 
5 
built several diesel-powered units.  The first unit of the 
Tikuna class, a submarine built in Brazil, was launched on 
March 10, 2005, in a ceremony attended by President Luis 
Inacio Lula da Silva.  The design is meant to be a 
stepping-stone towards the ultimate development of a 
nuclear submarine, a program that has been plagued by 
delays and barriers.  Nevertheless, the desire is so great 
for such a unit in the Brazilian Navy that interest has 
never waned, and as of this writing the nuclear submarine 
is still planned to enter service around 2020.13 
The current state of the Brazilian Navy is one that 
makes it the most capable in Latin America.  Brazil may not 
have large numbers of ships, but the ships it has chosen to 
acquire are of higher quality that those operated in other 
countries in the region.  No other country in Latin America 
has the means to operate an aircraft carrier, with all of 
the requisite maintenance and responsibility that goes 
along with such a unit.  The recent acquisitions of the 
carrier Sao Paulo, the anti-submarine escort frigates from 
Britain, and the planned nuclear submarine all point 
Brazil’s Navy towards blue water, and further from the 
shores it has traditionally clung to. 
C. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
Why would Brazil choose to pursue such a costly force?  
What are the causes and motivations that brought about the 
current situation with respect to the Brazilian Navy?  
These are both important questions arising from the recent 
naval developments in Brazil that will be addressed in this 
paper.  There are three main veins of thought that 
                     
13
 Rafael Cariello, “President Lula Helps Launch New Submarine,” in 
São Paulo Folha de São Paulo, March 10, 2005, FBIS Document ID: 
LAP20050310000082. 
6 
contribute to explaining the answers to these questions, 
and this thesis is divided into three chapters to analyze 
each in turn. 
In Chapter II, the concept of power and prestige will 
be discussed.  The idea that naval power is interconnected 
with the desire for greater power and prestige with respect 
to the world community has helped to cause Brazil to 
maintain and expand its naval power.  Earlier examples of 
nations, such as Ancient Rome’s construction of a navy to 
gain additional power, Germany’s building of a fleet to 
rival that of Britain in order to expand its influence, and 
the naval arms race that ended in the Washington Naval 
Treaty will all be mentioned.  Finally, Brazil’s own case 
will be compared to these, and shown as similar in scope.  
Chapter III will discuss Brazil’s desire for a seat on 
the United Nations Security Council, and why the 
maintenance of a blue-water fleet is relevant to achieving 
that goal.  In recent years, there have been numerous calls 
for reform of the UN Security Council, many centering 
around the assertion that the body no longer represents the 
emergence of new powers around the world, including India 
and Brazil, among others.  Brazil, which is as of this 
writing occupying one of the rotating seats on the Security 
Council, has taken several steps to prove that it is worthy 
of a permanent seat, when reform comes.  Increased 
involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, especially in 
Haiti, where Brazil is the lead country is one main 
example.  The naval rebirth that Brazil is currently 
undergoing, including the new naval aviation capability 
afforded by the carrier São Paulo, will provide a much 
greater ability to respond to crises.  Brazil undoubtedly 
7 
views enhanced naval power as a means to achieving its 
desired end of permanent membership on the Security 
Council. 
Chapter IV will focus on domestic politics in Brazil, 
and how it relates to the current naval situation in the 
country.  The creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense 
will be introduced, and its relevance to military programs 
discussed.  The SIVAM system, a hugely expensive military 
surveillance system meant to keep tabs on the vast Amazon 
region, was completed recently after many years of 
development and construction.  At the same time SIVAM was 
being built, however, and despite its price tag topping $1 
billion, the Navy was also receiving the first of its new 
platforms, including the new aircraft carrier.  The Navy 
was able to do this in light of the fact that SIVAM was 
primarily an Air Force and Army enterprise, and thus the 
Navy was able to lobby for compensatory funding.  Finally, 
the concept of institutional emulation, the idea of a 
country essentially copying the institutions of another 
more successful country, will be introduced and its 
application to Brazil discussed. 
The thesis concludes with the realization that while 
the three arguments presented each independently contribute 
to Brazil’s naval expansion, in reality they are mutually 
dependent.  For example, while it is true that Brazil’s 
government wishes to expand the Navy in order to better its 
chances of gaining a seat on the UN Security Council, 
domestic politics in Brazil and public opinion are also in 
favor of this end.  Civilians seem to wish to preserve 
Brazil’s sovereignty and respect on the world stage, and as 
a result generally favor a Navy capable of doing more than 
8 
patrolling the coast of their country.  In the end, Brazil 
has placed itself on a course that will be able to take its 
fleet far from its shores, into the blue water that 




II. POWER AND PRESTIGE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
History has shown that nations throughout history 
associate the prestige of a given state to the relative 
amount of power it can wield.  This is especially true of 
naval forces, which over the centuries have consistently 
been an instrument of power for states that can afford to 
possess them.  For Brazil, maintaining a blue-water capable 
fleet is one of the keys to becoming the primary regional 
power in South America, as well as increasing its own level 
of prestige, both among its peers in Latin America as well 
as with the rest of the world.   
Though there are many historical examples very similar 
to the Brazil case, there are several especially worthy of 
note.  As it emerged from a small, solely land-oriented 
civilization to one that dominated the Mediterranean 
region, Ancient Rome required a navy in order to counter 
its rival, Carthage.  After its victory over Carthage in 
the Punic Wars, the fleet created by Rome helped the 
fledgling empire become master of the Mediterranean region.  
A second case was when Germany became a state following the 
Franco-Prussian War in the late nineteenth century.  The 
new state saw building a modern steel navy as the only way 
of countering British naval supremacy, as well as a way to 
attain greater esteem on the world stage amongst the other 
powers of the time.  Both of these cases represent two 
previously land-oriented nations that pursued costly naval 
construction programs in an effort to gain more power.  As 
will  be   shown,  Rome’s   decision  to  do  so  made  the  
10 
Mediterranean its own “pond,” while the German pursuit of a 
navy disrupted world order, sparking an international arms 
race.   
A discussion of the power and prestige argument would 
be incomplete without mention of the United States’ fleet 
expansion at the end of the 19th Century, and thus is 
included here.  What began initially as a modest 
shipbuilding program in response to the acquisition of 
battleships in South American countries ended with the 
Unites States committing itself to a blue water naval 
force.  Finally, the early twentieth century in the post 
World War I years saw the resumption of a naval arms race, 
begun at the time Germany was creating its fleet in the 
last nineteenth century and paused around the time of World 
War I.  Following World War I, the race resumed, abated 
only by the Washington Naval Treaty in 1921 between the 
major world naval powers.  Each state attempted to possess 
the strongest fleet possible, both for the sheer power as 
well as the prestige of it.   
In the realm of international politics, much as been 
written on why states pursue power.  Of the several 
theories fielded, ranging from liberalism to realism, the 
theory of “offensive realism”14 as put forth by John J. 
Mearsheimer seems to best explain why Brazil is in pursuit 
of a blue water naval force.  This chapter will explore 
Brazil’s pursuit of greater power and prestige through its 
naval force, first by using Mearsheimer’s theory to set a 
baseline.  Additionally, historical examples of states 
pursuing similar strategies will be introduced for 
                     
14
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2001, 20-21. 
11 
comparison of Brazil’s situation.  The three included 
historical examples were selected both because of their 
focus on naval power, and their relevance to the theory of 
offensive realism that creates a common thread with the 
current Brazilian case. 
B. OFFENSIVE REALISM 
To help explain why states compete for power, various 
international relations experts have created several 
theories.  Generally, these theories break down into either 
the field of liberalism or realism.  Liberalism is in 
general a more optimistic approach to the issue, while 
realism tends to be more ominous or dark.  One of the best 
examples of liberalism applicable to this case is the 
theory of defensive realism, where states seek to 
essentially preserve the status quo, and are not concerned 
with expanding their power in the interest of maintaining 
the balance of power.15  This seems logical, but 
unfortunately defensive realism does not take into account 
the fact that 
The international system creates powerful 
incentives for states to look for opportunities 
to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to 
take advantage of those situations when the 
benefits outweigh the costs...16 
It is this hypothesis upon which John Mearsheimer 
bases his theory of offensive realism, a somewhat more 
dreary view, yet one that fits in well with the theme of 
this chapter.  
Mearsheimer believes there is a “compelling logic” in 
his belief that great powers seek to “maximize their share 
                     
15
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2001, 20-21. 
16
 Ibid, 21. 
12 
of world power,”17 and in the end, have “hegemony as their 
final goal.”18  His explanation for this lies in five 
fundamental assumptions concerning the international 
system.  These assumptions are: 
1. The international system is anarchic...the 
system comprises independent states that have no 
central authority above them.19 
2. Great powers inherently possess some offensive 
military capability, which gives them the 
wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each 
other.20 
3. States can never be certain about other 
states’ intentions…indeed, all of the states in 
the system may be relatively benign, but it is 
impossible to be sure of that judgment because 
intentions are impossible to divine with 100 
percent certainty.21 
4. Survival is the primary goal of great powers.  
Specifically, states seek to maintain their 
territorial integrity and the autonomy of their 
domestic political order.22 
5. Great powers are rational actors.  They are 
aware of their external environment and they 
think strategically about how to survive in it.23 
These five assumptions, taken together, according to 
Mearsheimer, best explain why states pursue a strategy of 
increasing their level of power relative to other states. 
                     
17
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New 














The theory of offensive realism focuses mainly on 
great power states, which are defined according to 
Mearsheimer as states that must have “sufficient military 
assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional 
war against the most powerful state in the world.”24  
Arguably, however, offensive realism is not confined solely 
to these great power states, and could also be considered 
in a regional sense.  Emerging powers such as China, India, 
and Brazil can all fit under this umbrella, as they are all 
seeking to increase their level of power relative to those 
around them in an attempt to dominate their particular 
regions.  Since “the fortunes of all states—great powers 
and smaller powers alike—are determined primarily by the 
decisions and actions of those with the greatest 
capability,”25 it only follows logically, then, that those 
with the potential for the greatest power in their 
respective regions would seek to attain that status. 
Applied to the acquisition of prestige, generally a 
state with great power garners prestige on the 
international stage as a result of the requisite level of 
power it wields.  For a state that, under the umbrella of 
offensive realism, is pursuing greater power, the reward of 
greater prestige is arguably one of the major goals of the 
state.  Greater prestige for emerging powers means greater 
attention paid them by the great powers, and thus a larger 
role in the world as a whole.  Thus, it is not surprising 
that a state that has the capability to attain greater 
power, does in fact in most cases pursue that end. 
                     
24
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2001, 5. 
25
 Ibid, 5. 
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The offensive realism theory is best applicable to 
Brazil for these reasons.  The other main theories, 
defensive realism and liberalism, do not sufficiently 
explain Brazil’s actions.  Defensive realism focuses more 
on the idea that “states merely aim to survive,”26 and are 
concerned with the relative balance of power.  Brazil does 
not seem to be concerned with a balance of power in South 
America; rather, the reverse seems to be true.  Liberalism 
on the other hand, is not applicable to Brazil’s case 
primarily because it is too optimistic in its view of the 
world.  One of the main tenets of liberalism, that 
“calculations of power matter little for explaining the 
behavior of good states,”27 fails to explain Brazil’s 
actions.  Brazil is considered a “good state,” in that it 
is not hostile towards others, and yet it seems sincerely 
concerned with its own power and status in the world, thus 
sparking such programs as the current naval expansion. 
C. ANCIENT ROME 
At first glance, the mention of Rome might seem rather 
strange, as the events that resulted in Rome’s supremacy in 
the Mediterranean occurred so far in the past.  It is, 
however, one of the first examples of the expansion of 
naval power for the purpose of enhancing a nation’s power 
and prestige on record, and as such warrants a place here.  
The key point of reference for the Rome case is The Rise of 
the Roman Empire, originally written by the Greek historian 
Polybius over two thousand years ago.  The major point of 
separation between the Rome case and the Brazilian case is 
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 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2001, 19. 
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 Ibid, 16. 
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that Rome was building its fleet during wartime, but the 
underlying reasons are the same. 
In 261 BC, during the First Punic War, Rome was 
fighting with Carthage in the first of three wars that 
eventually resulted in Rome having control of the 
Mediterranean Sea.  As several Roman coastal cities fell 
prey to Carthaginian raids while Carthage itself suffered 
no such attack, “[the Romans] were filled with desire to 
take to sea and meet the Carthaginians there.”28  The main 
problem for the Romans was that they had never had a need 
to venture into the sea prior to the war with Carthage, and 
thus had no knowledge of shipbuilding or of naval warfare.  
Were it not for a fortuitous grounding of an enemy warship 
that fell into Roman hands, “…they would have been 
prevented from carrying out their programme for sheer lack 
of the necessary knowledge.”29 
Although the Romans had little experience in 
shipbuilding, they were able to produce innovative warships 
that made use of their own strengths.  Since Romans were 
most experienced with land combat, the obvious step for 
them was to create warships that could attach themselves to 
their enemy and take the fight directly aboard their 
enemy’s ship, using Rome’s effective ground troops to 
defeat the opponent.  Later, the Roman fleet was used in 
support of landings in Spain and Africa, and in some cases, 
notably against New Carthage in Spain, the fleet was 
actually used as a rudimentary “fire support” platform for 
the invading Roman troops.30  In this manner, Rome was able 
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 Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, London: Penguin Books, 
1979, 62. 
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 Ibid, 63. 
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 Ibid, 412-414. 
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to defeat Carthage and become the undisputed master of the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
Henceforth, Rome’s power grew in the region, reaching 
a point of complete hegemony only a few hundred years 
later.  According to Polybius,  
Since the Romans deliberately chose to school 
themselves [in naval affairs], it is quite 
natural that they should not only have boldly 
embarked on their pursuit of universal dominion, 
but that they should actually achieved their 
purpose.31  
As the years progressed and Rome’s power grew, so too 
did its prestige in the region.  Ancient Rome fits into 
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism equation quite well, for 
Rome desired to maintain its territorial integrity, and 
acted as a rational actor, expanding its power in order to 
compete with its rival, and in the end it achieved hegemony 
(Mearsheimer’s stated end state).   While it is true that 
Rome was a dominating power in the region both militarily 
and politically, it is also true that as a result of 
controlling the seas, Rome gained the power it sought.  
Without defeating Carthage on the seas and gaining naval 
supremacy in the Mediterranean shortly thereafter, Rome 
could likely never have ascended in the way it did.   
To compare this case to Brazil’s situation, Brazil is 
a nation that, while not pursuing a fleet in response to a 
hostile enemy, it is building to maintain its sovereignty.  
As Rome did before it, Brazil seeks to maintain a fleet 
capable of ensuring that its autonomy is never challenged, 
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and perhaps to serve as a reminder to other countries in 
South America that it is the regional power. 
D. THE KAISER’S NAVY 
Following the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War in 
1871, the German state was an official entity, all of the 
separate Prussian states having been united as a result of 
a solely land-oriented struggle.  As Holger Herwig writes, 
“The war at sea was conspicuous by its absence.”32  Indeed, 
to that time, Prussia had never needed a navy of any great 
power, as it had no major maritime interests to speak of.  
With the creation of the German Empire in the Hall of 
Mirrors at Versailles in 1871,33 that fact remained largely 
unchanged.  Some fifteen years later, however, when Wilhelm 
II ascended to the title of Emperor on June 15, 1888, the 
German attitude toward naval power “was to change 
dramatically.”34 
The new Kaiser turned out to be a great proponent of 
naval power, a desire of his that only grew stronger, 
almost to the point of obsessive, with time.  By the mid 
1890s, Wilhelm had read Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power 
upon History,35 a book that had a great effect upon him.  
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Possessing a navy was a sign of national 
greatness and power, and a strong naval force was 
virtually required for a nation to compete for 
economic and political influence around the 
world.36 
In a relatively limited time since Germany emerged as 
a state, it had already begun to acquire colonial 
possessions overseas.  These, of course, became some of the 
maritime interests that drove Germany to build a modern 
navy, the Kaiser’s own desires notwithstanding.  
In 1897, then, when Germany announced its intentions 
to build a large naval fleet, the decision was partially 
the result of the Kaiser’s great affinity towards naval 
power as well as the growing desire of Germany to emerge as 
a power to rival that of Great Britain, which up to that 
time had been the undisputed world naval power.  The 
Kaiser, in a speech delivered in 1900, summed up in a short 
space the German desire to attain power and prestige 
through the development of a modern navy: 
And as My grandfather [did] for the Army, so I 
will, for My Navy, carry on unerringly and in 
similar manner the work of reorganization so that 
it may also stand on an equal footing with My 
armed forces on land and so that through it the 
German Empire may also be in a position abroad to 
attain that place which it has not yet reached.37 
In short order, Germany had become a world power, 
though one of much more contemporary means than the others 
of the day.  Using offensive realism to explain this case, 
again as in the case of Rome, Germany felt threatened by 
another great power, Great Britain, as it sought to expand 
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its empire abroad.  Thus, Germany built up a navy to 
compete with Great Britain, and achieve its goals.  In less 
than two decades, both would be tested during World War I, 
which was at the time, the most devastating conflict 
between the European great powers in history. 
Brazil’s Navy when compared to this situation presents 
a notable similarity.  Germany had no true need for a large 
fleet, as its main source of power came from its land 
forces.  Brazil, while needing a modest fleet to protect 
fisheries and other maritime interests close to shore, 
truly has no need for a large oceangoing fleet capable of 
power projection (as an aircraft carrier affords a fleet).  
As German naval expansion directly contributed to a naval 
arms race amongst the major powers at the time, other 
maritime states in South America (notably Chile) may be 
forced to expand their own fleets in order to create 
balance.  
E. UNITED STATES NAVAL EXPANSION IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY 
As the 20th Century approached, the United States found 
itself increasingly conflicted over whether to remain an 
isolationist state, or to embark on more ambitious 
aspirations in the world.  Until the mid 1880s, the United 
States had no formal battleships in service, nor did it 
consider itself a naval power with global reach.  When 
around that time several South American nations acquired 
modern battleships for their navies, the Unites States 
finally constructed its own ships in order to create 
balance.  However, once those two ships hit the water, the 
tide of change had been set in motion. 
Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History was 
published in 1890, and had a great impact on thinking 
20 
within the U.S. Navy and U.S. Government.  That publication 
and its effects, coupled with other outspoken proponents of 
naval power, amounted to greater calls for naval expansion.  
Congress eventually agreed, and passed the Naval Act of 
1890, which authorized several new battleships, capable of 
operations far from coastal waters, to enter the fleet.38 
A fleet that could operate far from home at the turn 
of the century required coaling stations.  Fuel-hungry 
battleships could not steam for more than several thousand 
miles at the time without needing replenishment, and thus 
the Navy began searching for ways to acquire overseas 
coaling stations.  Other European states such as Britain, 
and later, Germany, were all attempting to do the same 
thing, giving the U.S. even greater resolve to find these 
strategic locations.  When the Spanish-American War came in 
1898, the U.S. got exactly what it needed.  Overseas bases 
in the Philippines, among other places, added many 
strategic fueling locations for the ever-growing U.S. 
fleet, and began to give the U.S. Navy more of a global 
reach.  
The U.S. by the early 1900s had become an imperialist 
power, with a large, modern, blue water fleet.  The fleet 
became the instrument of acquiring greater power and 
prestige amongst other contemporary nations.  Arguably, 
U.S. involvement in the building of a blue water fleet also 
helped to contribute to a global naval arms race between 
the major naval powers.  This arms race lasted well into 
the 20th Century, and was only curbed by formal treaty in 
1921. 
                     
38
 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years Of Sea Power, Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1993, 22. 
21 
F. THE INTERWAR NAVAL ARMS RACE 
The period between World War I and World War II was 
tumultuous, especially as the great power states looked at 
their naval fleets and saw inadequacies when compared to 
others.  The major powers with large fleets at the time, 
Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and 
others with smaller fleets began to embark on hugely 
expensive shipbuilding programs.  These ranged from 
building new battleships (the “strategic” weapon of the 
time) to most any type of vessel then in use.  Primarily, 
however, the focus was upon capital ships, as the 
battleship almost always was used as a measure of power for 
a given country.   
What ensued was a naval arms race potentially of epic 
proportions, though it was more a continuation of an arms 
race that had essentially been ongoing since before World 
War I.  Germany had already embarked on a naval building 
program to rival that of Britain, and as a result had 
sparked a naval arms race involving nearly all the great 
powers of the time.39  Once the arms race had resumed post-
World War I, each successive ship design to come off the 
ways was bigger, more powerful, and more expensive than the 
one before it.  As one state fielded a new ship class, 
others would rush to match or gain a step up over it.  In 
Mearsheimer’s view, this would be standard procedure for 
states acting as rational actors under the theory of 
offensive realism.  Each state was attempting to ensure its 
own survival in an anarchic international system.  As each 
state was unsure of the others’ true intentions, they were 
forced to engage in this struggle for naval supremacy. 
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It was the United States that in 1921 first proposed a 
conference to limit the destructive arms race that had 
transpired.  President Harding at the time was of the view 
that 
The core of the problem was to be found in 
competitive programmes, and that before naval 
armaments could be effectively controlled it was 
essential to get rid of the spirit of rivalry.40   
Only after lengthy discussions with the major powers 
was some semblance of trust reached, and a treaty signed.  
The Washington Naval Treaty, as it came to be called, 
placed limits on the tonnage of capital ships that each 
power could build in the ratio of “5, 5, 3, 1.67, 1.67”41 
for the U.S., Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy.   
The treaty worked for approximately ten years, but as 
the shadow of World War II loomed, some states ignored the 
treaty (Japan, in particular), and revived their 
shipbuilding programs.  Thus, despite efforts to curb fully 
the naval arms race, the reality of the international 
system at the time practically guaranteed that states would 
eventually go back to vying for greater power over the 
others.  Therefore, the theory of offensive realism seems 
to apply to this case as well.  As Mearsheimer states, a 
state realizes that power is the “key to survival,”42 and 
will pursue any means necessary to gain the power it deems 
necessary to survive.  The Washington Treaty limits were 
thus ineffective in the long term for this reason. 
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The Washington Treaty case, as stated, was an 
outgrowth of the problems created when Germany built a 
modern naval force in the late nineteenth century.  For 
Brazil, again, naval expansion in South America might in 
the long run result in a similar situation amongst states 
such as Chile or Argentina that also have an interest in 
the sea.  The nations involved in the Washington Conference 
were all attempting to best each other with the size and 
capability of their fleets, and in doing so achieve 
superiority.  Brazil follows this mold with respect to its 
neighbors in South America, and arguably has become the 
superior naval force in the region because of its actions. 
G. THE BRAZILIAN CASE 
The preceding examples have provided clear historical 
examples of nations expanding their naval power as a means 
to gain more power and prestige.  Time and again, history 
has shown that one of the main reasons a state decides to 
build a fleet centers around its desire for a greater role 
in the world.  Applying the power and prestige argument to 
Brazil, it will be shown that the case is quite similar.   
The Brazilian Navy has always been an enigmatic force 
in South America, mainly because South America has enjoyed 
relative peace with respect to interstate conflict.  
Argentina and Brazil had been labeled as military rivals in 
the mid twentieth century, but those comparisons ceased to 
exist around the time of the failure of Argentina in the 
Malvinas conflict.  Though Brazil possesses some of the 
most advanced shipbuilding capabilities in the South 
American region, a large number of the ships in the fleet 
came from purchases of ships from other countries.  Only 
recently has the Brazilian shipbuilding industry begun to 
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produce modern units, including submarines, on its own.   
For most of the second half of the twentieth century, 
Brazil and Argentina were naval rivals, with each country 
possessing an aircraft carrier and modest fleets capable of 
dealing with the other.  With the decline of the Argentine 
Navy in the 1990s, Brazil has emerged as the dominant naval 
force in South America. 
In the 1980s, at about the time Argentina had fought 
and lost the Falklands War, the Brazilian Navy’s ability to 
project power ashore was “seriously restricted.”43  While 
Brazil did have an aircraft carrier, due to restrictions 
placed upon it at the time as well as limitations of the 
aging platform itself (Minas Gerais was a secondhand 
British light carrier from World War II), the carrier only 
embarked helicopters in its air wing.  Brazil’s amphibious 
capability was nonexistent, as were other common methods of 
naval power projection.   
In recent years, however, the negative trend in power 
projection capability has been changing.  With the 
acquisition in 2000 of the former French aircraft carrier 
Foch, now renamed Sao Paulo, Brazil’s carrier capability 
increased dramatically over the obsolescent Minas Gerais.  
The acquisition would likely not have been considered had 
not the dispute with the Air Force over the Navy owning its 
own fixed wing aircraft been resolved.  Once the dispute 
was ended, Brazil purchased in 1998 twenty-three A-4 attack 
aircraft from Kuwait specifically for use on the carrier.44  
These two acquisitions alone, while by no means state of 
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the art, give Brazil a power projection capability an order 
of magnitude greater than it had previously possessed. 
Aside from carrier aviation, Brazil has in recent 
years begun to construct its own ships, albeit using 
foreign designs and components.  New frigates and 
submarines are under construction as of this writing, and 
other units have been acquired in addition to the carrier.  
These include four highly capable antisubmarine warfare 
frigates from Great Britain and several retired amphibious 
ships from the United States.  There has even been talk in 
recent years of acquiring retired Spruance-class destroyers 
from the United States,45 warships that in U.S. service were 
capable of launching the Tomahawk cruise missile for use in 
strike warfare.  While this missile would almost certainly 
not be supplied to Brazil should this deal ever take place, 
the sheer capability of these destroyers with respect to 
others in the region, namely their robust antisubmarine 
warfare facilities and aforementioned strike warfare 
capabilities, would also represent a great step forward in 
Brazil’s power projection capability. 
The trend in modernization of the fleet and 
acquisition of a true power projection capability once 
again elicits the concept of offensive realism.  Based on 
the history of the past twenty years in South America, 
Brazil clearly is aiming to be a regional hegemon in South 
America, having already essentially achieved regional 
economic dominance through MERCOSUR and other recently 
created institutions.  Traditional rivals such as Argentina 
are no longer capable of affording military forces such as 
                     
45
 “Destroyers, Brazil,” in Jane’s Fighting Ships, updated on 5 March 
2004, online at www.janes.com, accessed December 2004. 
26 
Brazil possesses, leaving Brazil ahead of all others in the 
region.  Assuming Brazil seeks regional hegemony as a final 
goal, it will need to attain the greatest share of world 
power possible in order to achieve that end.  The 
acquisition of more naval power is the form in which this 
greater share of world power presents itself for Brazil.  
To only examine Brazil’s Navy in recent years proves this 
assumption, but when taking into account further military 
developments such as the multi-billion dollar SIVAM 
surveillance system,46 the point becomes more concrete. 
H. CONCLUSION 
As with Rome, Germany, and the states involved in the 
naval arms race prior to World War II, Brazil is itself 
seeking prestige through the expansion of power.  In the 
Navy’s case, power is being acquired through a complete 
modernization of the fleet, from top to bottom.  As the 
battleship was once the symbol of national prestige and 
power, so today is the aircraft carrier.  Few nations can 
afford to build and/or maintain such ships today, and 
Brazil has clearly demonstrated a desire to be among them.   
The theory of offensive realism explains best the 
Brazilian desire for greater power, and thus, prestige.  A 
state seeks to acquire the most power possible so that it 
can both remain secure as well as achieve the end goal of 
hegemony.  Though the Brazilian fleet is by no means a 
modern force as compared to the United States or Great 
Britain, it does remain relatively powerful and capable.  
It is certainly the dominant fleet in South America today, 
and will likely remain that way.  If the current trend of 
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military modernization, especially in the Brazilian Navy, 
continues, Brazil will achieve the status of regional 
hegemon in South America.  Once again, the theory of 
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III. BRAZIL, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THE NAVY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Moving from the realm of Mearsheimer’s offensive 
realism theory and the power and prestige angle, the next 
step in this analysis involves Brazil and its desire to 
play a greater role in the United Nations.  In recent 
years, as global conditions changed, there have been 
increasing calls from around the world for drastic changes 
to be made to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).47  
Many of the proposed changes center around the fact that 
the world is no longer the same one upon which the UN 
Security Council was originally formed following World War 
II.  Specifically, many of the proposals to change the UNSC 
involve adding newly emerging regional powers as permanent 
members of the UNSC.  Brazil is generally considered to be 
a front-runner for one of these spots should the 
opportunity arise.  
Brazil itself has wished to become part of such an 
expanded UNSC for some time, but with the election of 
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in the beginning of 
2003, Brazil increased greatly its lobbying for a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council.  In a speech delivered to 
the commanders-in-chief of the Brazilian Armed forces at 
the end of 2003, the Brazilian Defense Minister stated that 
“…it is essential, above all, that the United Nations 
Organization be reformed, and in particular its Security 
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Council.”48  As if to add to Brazil’s push for such an 
event, on January 1, 2004 Brazil took a seat for a two-year 
term as one of the rotating members of the Security 
Council, and later in the year offered to lead the 
peacekeeping effort in Haiti.  Overall, “[Brazil’s] actions 
have been a test of how it would behave if it were made a 
permanent member [of the Security Council].”49 
This chapter will focus on Brazil’s increasing desire 
to fill a seat on an expanded UN Security Council and will 
explain why the expansion of her navy fits in well with 
such an aspiration.  Generally, the five current permanent 
members all possess a large naval force (with respect to 
most other states).  The other states lobbying for 
positions on the permanent UNSC, including India and Japan, 
also either currently possess decent naval forces, or are 
in the process of overhaul, expansion and modernization 
like Brazil.  Possessing such naval power may not be a 
written prerequisite for being a permanent Security Council 
member, but the power projection capabilities such a force 
carries with it does say much for the ability of a state to 
undertake UN operations, including peacekeeping.  The 
chapter will begin with a short representation of the 
current makeup of the UNSC, followed by a brief account of 
the proposals to overhaul it.  Next, Brazil’s own recent 
actions in achieving this goal, including its current (as 
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of this writing) leadership of the UN peacekeeping mission 
in Haiti will be presented.  Finally, how the navy’s 
expansion fits in to the equation will be discussed. 
B. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND CALLS FOR REFORM 
The UN as an international organization has been in 
existence since the close of World War II, when the 
victorious allied powers created it “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.”50  The Security 
Council itself consists of fifteen member states, five of 
which are permanent (United States, Great Britain, Russia, 
China, and France), and ten non-permanent members who serve 
for two-year terms (each year about half rotate).51  As of 
this writing, as discussed earlier, Brazil is currently 
serving as one of the non-permanent members (its term will 
end at the end of 2005).  For the duration of the Cold War, 
the Security Council was often bogged down by the bipolar 
world that was represented by two of its permanent members, 
the United States and the Soviet Union.  After the collapse 
of the latter, the restraints and inaction of the “Cold War 
impasse”52 gave way to a greatly increased role in, among 
other things, international peacekeeping. 
Despite its recent successes and greater action, there 
has been an increasing amount of calls to reform the 
Security Council.  The general arguments for reform center 
around two main issues.  First, that the permanent members 
of the Security Council is made up of states that were 
either considered global powers at the close of World War 
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II or rose to that status shortly thereafter, but today are 
no longer the powers they once were.53  The second argument 
is that since World War II, “new powers have emerged and 
are asking for their rightful place in the Security 
Council.”54  Among these include emerging regional powers 
such as Brazil and India.  Essentially, these arguments 
translate to one key point, that the Security Council is no 
longer reflective of today’s vastly different world, when 
compared to the one from which the original UNSC was 
conceived at San Francisco following World War II. 
One of the more popular proposals to reform the 
Security Council has come from Japan, the basic idea of 
which would be to increase the number of permanent members 
from 5 to 10, and the number of rotating seats from 10 to 
14.55  The United States, for its part, proposed a “regional 
representation in which one country represents a 
continent.”56  Since such a proposal will almost certainly 
generate disagreement as to who deserves the seat more 
between one or more states in a given region (Brazil and 
Argentina, for example), other suggestions have included 
rotating the permanent members within a given region to 
give a more equitable arrangement within the UN Security 
Council. 
Regardless of the final outcome of Security Council 
reform, it is highly likely that it will occur in the near 
future.  States such as Brazil, India, Nigeria, and several 
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others all seem to be “in the running” to become permanent 
members of the Security Council.  Because of Brazil’s 
position as an emerging regional power, like India and 
several other prospective candidates, the chances of it 
being chosen to fill a permanent seat on an expanded 
Security Council are fairly good. 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN HAITI 
Most recently, Brazil’s decision to become involved in 
the United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Haiti is even 
more important than the SIVAM program, as it reflects a 
determination to be more involved in the UN not previously 
seen.  In the most recent (2004) crisis in Haiti, Brazil 
offered to lead the United Nations Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), the successor to the crisis-response Multi-
National Interim Force (MIF).  Since then, Brazil has 
garnered respect from the world community for stepping up 
and offering its military services so willingly. 
The crisis in Haiti had been brewing for several 
years.  In a country with little progress made in 
democratic consolidation since the last time (1994) the 
United Nations had a mission within its borders, it is 
little surprise that in 2004, a rebellion was sparked into 
life against President Aristide.  After an interim force 
authorized by UNSC Resolution 152957 and led by a small 
group from the U.S. and several other nations, a second 
mission was proposed to more adequately deal with keeping 
the peace.  On April 30, 2004, the United Nations Mission 
in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was authorized,58 and Brazil stepped up 
to take the lead of the new mission, deploying the largest 
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contingent of troops to the beleaguered country.  This was 
followed in much fewer numbers by several other Latin 
American states shortly thereafter.59 
MINUSTAH has since turned out to be Brazil’s largest 
military deployment since World War II.60  Following closely 
with Brazilian military involvement in the UN peacekeeping 
mission in East Timor, it also has a predictive quality, in 
that this may only be the beginning.  Given Brazil’s (and 
President Lula’s) desire for a more active role in the 
United Nations, including gaining a seat on the Security 
Council, it is no surprise that Brazil has opted to take 
these actions.  It is also likely that should the Security 
Council be reformed, Brazil’s willingness to lead missions 
such as MINUSTAH will bode well for its consideration to 
occupy the seat it desires.   
D. THE NAVY’S ROLE  
While it may not seem apparent at first glance, the 
Brazilian Navy does have an important role in Brazil’s 
desire to occupy a seat on the Security Council.  In states 
such as Brazil and India, which also is building up its 
navy and is also in the running for a Security Council seat 
(should reform come), a fleet becomes extremely useful.  
Should Brazil receive its Security Council position, it 
will be expected to act as the other states currently on it 
do with respect to UNSC resolutions.  Specifically, Brazil 
may become more involved in overseas UN operations.  As 
with the United States, France and the United Kingdom, 
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Brazil may come to rely on its Navy to respond to crises 
that emerge, especially if they are in the Latin American 
or West African regions. 
The Brazilian Navy possesses an amphibious force of 
three large ships (all acquired from the United States),61 
and of course the aircraft carrier Sao Paulo.  These ships, 
as well as numerous other support vessels, provide Brazil 
with a modest power projection capability that is 
invaluable in crisis response.  With Brazil’s continued 
plans to develop something more than a “home defense” 
fleet, it seems likely that the future holds more overseas 
involvement in store. 
Aside from the aircraft carrier and amphibious forces, 
a great deal of focus has been placed on Brazil’s ever-
increasing desire to build a nuclear-powered submarine to 
add to its fleet.  Were one to use this type of unit as a 
basis for comparison with respect to the current permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, it would become obvious 
that all five operate nuclear powered submarines in their 
own navies.  It is interesting to note that no other world 
naval forces besides the five permanent UNSC members 
currently have such units in service, though several 
“prospective” UNSC members are all attempting to pursue the 
acquisition of them. 
In a 2003 article in the Argentine newspaper La 
Nacion, analyst Rosendo Fraga wrote: 
Brazil’s decision to accelerate construction of a 
nuclear submarine, so that it can be placed in 
service in 2010, confirms the country’s intention 
                     
61
 “Brazil,” Jane’s Fighting Ships website, online at 
http://jfs.janes.com, accessed June 2004. 
 
36 
to become a “player” on the world scene and 
consolidate itself as a major power in South 
America, as India has done in Asia and South 
Africa in Africa.62 
The idea of Brazil building a nuclear submarine has 
been an “on again, off again” affair for more than twenty 
years.63  However, in recent years, and especially with the 
start of the naval buildup by President Cardoso in the late 
1990s64 and continuation of it in Lula’s administration, the 
program has taken on much greater importance.  In a late 
2004 interview, Brazilian Navy Commander Roberto de 
Guimares Carvalho stated that the “nuclear-powered 
submarine constitutes the natural strategic solution for 
[Brazil’s] Defense System.”65  Thus, it becomes clearer that 
Brazil is most certainly intending on following through 
with its nuclear submarine program.  Possessing a nuclear 
submarine may not have any direct impact on operations 
supporting the United Nations, but considering, as stated 
before, the fact that the five permanent members all 
possess such units, were Brazil to successfully acquire 
one, it would join the ranks of an “exclusive” group of 
nations, and might well have a better chance of gaining a 
permanent seat. 
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E. BRAZILIAN NAVAL DOCTRINE 
Brazil’s fleet has historically been more focused on 
coastal defense than on having a fleet capable of operating 
on the high seas.  While the possession of its aircraft 
carrier through the late twentieth century was enigmatic in 
that it was never used to the extent of its capabilities, 
the fact that the carrier was replaced with a new unit at 
the end of its life is perhaps more important than the mere 
existence of the ship.  The acquisition of the Sao Paulo 
and the new plans for rehabilitating and modernizing the 
fleet reflect a distinct change in doctrine for the 
previously coastal force.  In the same interview discussing 
the nuclear submarine, the Brazilian Navy Commander 
Carvalho stated his vision of where his fleet was headed in 
the early twenty-first century: 
The prevailing strategic concept for countries 
that have limited defense budgets...is to possess 
means capable, not of defeating any adversary, 
but of imposing a high cost on any military 
option, dissuading aggression and providing an 
incentive for the peaceful solution of 
controversies...It is within this concept that 
the Navy is seeking to develop a naval power with 
modern features....66 
It is under this precept that Brazil has acquired the 
new carrier, pressed forward with development of the 
nuclear submarine program and enacted a major fleet 
modernization program.   
Looking further out into the sea, Brazil now seems to 
be eyeing the whole of the South Atlantic as its personal 
bastion of sorts.  Carvalho was quoted as calling this area 
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Brazil’s “Blue Amazon,”67 essentially waters including 
Brazil’s claimed 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, 
and with the continental shelf included in this area, going 
as far as 350 miles beyond the shores of Brazil.  While 
this tends to place Brazil more in the category of a 
regional power than a world power, it should be noted that 
not all of the UN Security Council’s permanent members are 
world powers.  China is most certainly a regional power as 
of this writing, and Brazil seems to be consolidating this 
role for itself. 
F. CONCLUSION 
As Brazil’s capabilities for pressing further from the 
shores into the South Atlantic increase, so too does its 
ability to exert influence on those around it – perhaps a 
prerequisite for being an active member of the UN Security 
Council.  While some of Brazil’s naval programs may not 
directly be tied to the country’s desire to gain a seat on 
the Security Council, arguably they do have an indirect 
effect.  Brazil’s active involvement in UN Peacekeeping in 
recent years has proved its willingness to contribute to 
the organization, and has only served to increase its 
reputation among the other member nations.  The increasing 
power of the Navy proves that Brazil wishes to be more of a 
player in world politics, for even though navies as 
instruments of world power are no longer what they once 
were, the resources and commitment needed to field units 
such as an aircraft carrier or a nuclear submarine are only 
accessible to those states that wish to prove they have the 
means to do so. 
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IV. THE NAVY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding two chapters, the idea of power and 
prestige contributing to Brazil’s naval expansion, as well 
as a look at how the United Nations Security Council has 
affected, most especially in recent years, the Brazilian 
Navy.  One area that has yet to be discussed, however, is 
the domestic angle.  Brazilian domestic politics has, in 
the best Latin American tradition, been quite tumultuous 
throughout its history.  It was not until the 1980s that 
democratic consolidation finally began in Brazil, and not 
until even more recently that a key indicator of a 
relatively stable democracy, a civilian-led Ministry of 
Defense, was instituted. 
From a domestic point of view, the past few years has 
seen a series of events that seem to have contributed to 
the Brazilian government’s willingness to expand the Navy.  
This chapter will seek to focus on these events, and prove 
that domestic politics in Brazil has had a role in the 
current expansion of the Brazilian fleet by discussing 
first the creation of the Ministry of Defense, the all-
important democratic institution.  Additionally, the SIVAM 
program will be discussed, as its costly development by the 
military may well have contributed to strengthening the 
Navy's case for an expanded force structure indirectly.  
Finally, I will explore the role that institutional 
emulation – a theory explaining that a given state will 
develop a certain institution by “emulating” a similar one 
in a comparable state – played in the decision to expand 
Brazil's Navy.  While this theory may sound at first more 
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in the realm of international relations, it is in fact 
Brazilian domestic politics that has the final say in any 
such endeavor. 
B. THE BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY 
The creation of the Brazilian Defense Ministry in 1999 
was arguably one of the single most important developments 
in Brazilian defense policy since the fall of the military 
government in 1985.  While still in its infancy and 
experiencing “teething problems” such as the recent 
resignation of Defense Minister Jose Viegas in November 
2004,68 having civilians in control of the defense ministry 
gives Brazil more respect on the world stage and increases 
its ability to more efficiently control its armed forces, 
both in an operational sense and, perhaps most importantly, 
its finances and procurement.   
When the chains of military dictatorship were finally 
cast aside in 1985, the new civilian government had its 
work cut out for it.  The military was a strong and highly 
influential force in government, and had little intention 
of moving from that position.  For the first fifteen years 
of democracy in Brazil, each cabinet post related to the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force was headed by a military officer. 
It was not until Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed the 
presidency in 1995 that things finally began to change.  
Cardoso knew that the military would very likely oppose any 
plan to institute civilian control over them, so he 
shrewdly took any chance he could to avoid conflict with 
the military leadership, in the hopes that they would 
eventually concede.  Their concession was rewarded with 
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increased funding across the board, including the navy, and 
in some ways was the beginning of the expansion.  Thus, 
during his administration, Cardoso was able to keep the 
military at bay by giving his forces some of what they 
wanted most: military pay and modernization of the forces.  
In 1998, “the military dissatisfaction over pay…”69 was 
ended when a 113% pay raise was authorized, greater than 
anything the military had hoped for.  All the services also 
received some funding for much needed modernization.  The 
Navy was authorized to purchase twenty-three A-4 Skyhawk 
attack aircraft for use aboard its carrier Minas Gerais 
(since replaced by Sao Paulo), the 1963 regulation70 
limiting fixed wing aircraft to the Air Force having been 
repealed.71  The military, though still retaining most of 
its influence, was essentially pacified through Cardoso’s 
actions.  
In the final years of the Cardoso administration, the 
defense budget rose by the year 2000 to some $17.8 
billion,72 which was “more than the rest of South America 
combined.”  This included the purchase in the same year of 
the retired French aircraft carrier Foch (renamed Sao Paulo 
in Brazilian service), both to replace the aging, World War 
II era Minas Gerais, and to serve as a platform for the 
Navy’s new aircraft acquired the year before from Kuwait.  
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The much heralded (and hugely expensive) SIVAM system also 
went into service under these funds, as well as several 
other military purchases, all of which were, interestingly 
enough, completed prior to the aforementioned defense 
review.73 
Once the Ministry of Defense had been successfully 
created, civilians assumed control over most of the armed 
forces’ arenas.  With the removal of military officers from 
their positions as cabinet ministers, the overall power of 
the defense ministry has decreased, but influence over the 
services has increased.  Attention has since the Ministry’s 
creation in 1999 been turned towards streamlining thinking 
“more clearly about defence policy.”74  In 2000, Defense 
Minister Geraldo Quintao 
Launched a defence review - an exercise routine 
in rich democracies, but almost unprecedented in 
Latin America.  In Brazil’s case, it is overdue.75 
Much like the “Bottom-Up Review” or the Quadrennial 
Defense Review of the U.S. Defense Department, the intent 
was to focus Brazil’s “military capabilities with its 
foreign policy objectives,”76 funding them fully, and 
“trimming the fat” off programs that had become obsolete or 
were no longer of practical use in executing defense 
policy.  These defense reviews have in essence given a more 
thorough look at what aspects of the military are most 
essential  for  Brazil.  Thus, the fact that today the Navy  
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continues to evolve and expand reflects the fact that the 
civilian Ministry of Defense has had a positive effect on 
the military.  
At the end of 2003, the Brazilian Minister of Defence, 
Jose Viegas Filho, delivered a speech to his general 
officers in command of the military forces.  In that 
speech, Filho mentions several things that reflect the 
Ministry of Defense’s contribution to the Navy’s expansion.  
On funding, he stated: 
I am sure that a new steady level of funds for 
defense is one of the requirements of the 
state...In my ministry, I will seek in 2004, as I 
sought in the year that is closing, a frank 
dialog with the government with a view to 
explaining the importance of funds for defense 
activities, not just to pay for operating costs 
but also, and mainly, to make it possible to 
resume programs and projects that are fundamental 
to the reequipping and modernization of the means 
of defense at levels compatible with our real 
needs.77 
This quote reflects the relevance Filho places on 
modernization and procurement for the military in general.   
Additionally, he mentioned the Navy specifically in several 
instances.  On the type of fleet Brazil should conceivably 
possess, Filho said this: 
For its job of defending Brazil, the 
Navy...should have a fleet capable, if necessary, 
of denying the use of the sea, of dissuading and 
extending protection to threatened areas.  It is 
worth saying, we should persevere in developing 
nuclear propulsion for submarines, make every 
effort so that the aircraft carrier and its 
aircraft achieve a high degree of readiness, 
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[and] resume the normal cycle of maintenance and 
modernization of our naval equipment.78 
The fact that the Minister of Defense explained that 
Brazil should have a fleet capable of sea-denial is 
extremely important.  A fleet capable of sea-denial must be 
one that is either large, or if not large, extremely 
technologically capable.  Either pursuit, however, is 
extremely expensive, his mention of nuclear power 
notwithstanding.  This speech above all, however, reflects 
the relevance of the Ministry of Defense to the military in 
Brazil today, and helps to explain why the Brazilian Navy 
has enjoyed a rebirth during the past half-decade. 
The creation of the civilian-led Defense Ministry was 
indeed a momentous occasion in Brazilian domestic politics.  
Its existence and early successes have paved the way for 
ambitious programs such as SIVAM to be seen to their 
conclusion, while at the same time permitting the civilian 
government to remain in control over the armed forces.  The 
current naval expansion, including the previously mentioned 
aircraft carrier as well as several new programs have all 
come about following the transition to the Ministry of 
Defense from a system where the “ministers” were in reality 
the service commanders-in-chief.  Thus, its relative 
importance to Brazil’s navy cannot be refuted easily. 
C. SIVAM: NAVAL PROCUREMENT BOON? 
The SIVAM system, while purposely built as a 
domestically oriented project, has greater implications 
than simply a surveillance system of the Amazon basin.  The 
SIVAM project is viewed by many in Brazil as a natural 
extension of Brazil’s “manifest destiny,” or rather, the 
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development and settlement of the Amazon region.  A 
Brazilian admiral (interestingly enough) was quoted as 
stating: 
In Brazil we are 100 years behind the United 
States.  The development of the Amazon is simply 
a part of our national process, just as [the 
United States] governments populated the American 
West in the 19th Century.79 
First begun in the mid 1990s under the Cardoso 
administration, the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM 
system, is a large network of radar stations, satellites, 
and other components chiefly designed to watch over the 
skies along the border with Colombia and Peru in an effort 
to reduce the incidences of incursions by drug smuggling 
aircraft.  While this is the system’s primary mission, it 
also has side benefits such as environmental monitoring, 
and more importantly, it gives Brazil greater bargaining 
power in the region.   
The system itself was embattled from the start, as 
most hugely expensive projects are, regardless of where 
they originate.  Numerous allegations of impropriety were 
levied within the Brazilian government against the leaders 
of the program, but did these not result in any serious 
legal obstacles, and the system was built regardless.  Once 
completed, the SIVAM system cost Brazil a staggering $1.4 
billion, an unheard of price in Latin America for a single 
defense system.  As of this writing, the system is in full 
operation and has already resulted in several successes 
against drug smuggling aircraft, but perhaps the largest 
benefit to Brazil has only begun to be realized.  Brazil 
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has already begun to negotiate with its neighbors, Peru and 
especially Colombia,80 for use of the data from the SIVAM 
system.  Thus, SIVAM may likely be more important for 
securing Brazil’s role as a regional power, a role not 
originally intended for it, but with a $1.4 billion card to 
play, Brazil would be foolish not to play it. 
Arguably, another side benefit of the system, from the 
Navy’s perspective, is that the Air Force and Army spent 
the enormous amounts of money on the program.  As a result, 
this has contributed in some ways to the Navy’s own 
procurement.  The Brazilian government saw fit to increase 
the funding of the Navy in various arenas, since the Navy 
seemed to be having only a “trickle” of funding coming its 
way as a result of the SIVAM program.  This is an 
interesting side effect indeed, for with the staggering 
price tag of the SIVAM project, it is unusual that in a 
country where money is already tight, at the same time 
Brazil’s Navy was acquiring a new aircraft carrier from 
France, fixed-wing aircraft to fly from its decks, and 
other procurements such as highly capable antisubmarine 
warfare frigate from Great Britain, further domestic 
submarine construction, and carrier-capable aircraft. 
D. SIVAM AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY COMBINE TO AID THE NAVY 
While it is possible that in some ways, the Navy’s 
funding was increased as a result of SIVAM in order to 
place it on a more “equal footing” with its sister services 
in terms of expenditures, this may not entirely be the 
reason the Navy saw its funding increase.  With SIVAM 
already underway and consuming a large amount of resources 
during his administration, then-President Fernando Henrique 
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Cardoso also dramatically increased general military 
funding across the board beginning in 1995.  The following 
table clearly shows this increasing trend. 
 
Table 2.   Military Expenditures under Cardoso, 1994 to 
1998 
 
Year  Amount Spent (in FY00 Dollars) 
1994  $ 5.343 billion  
1995  $ 7.841 billion 
1996  $ 6.764 billion 
1997  $ 8.294 billion 
1998  $ 7.816 billion 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute81 
 
By the turn of the century, funding had increased to 
well over $8 billion annually, and currently shows no sign 
of easing.  This is where the budget-consuming SIVAM 
program and the drive to create the Ministry of Defense 
converged to aid the Navy’s budget.   
Essentially, two domestic factors arguably contributed 
to the Navy being able to expand its procurement and 
modernization.  First, the SIVAM program’s huge budget, 
mostly consumed by the Army and Air Force, gave the Navy 
more bargaining power to successfully ask for more money.  
The Navy more than likely felt left out by the massive 
amounts of attention and funding given the SIVAM program in 
the final years of the 1990s.  It is perhaps not 
coincidental that the decades old law banning the Navy from 
owning its own aircraft was only repealed during the 
initial construction period of the SIVAM project.  The 
authorization to purchase the A-4 attack aircraft, 
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personally authorized by President Cardoso, followed 
shortly thereafter, amidst the protests of the Brazilian 
Air Force.  Were it not for the fact of SIVAM’s high price 
tag and the Navy’s omission from “seeing” any of the money 
given that program, it is likely that these two events, not 
to mention the subsequent acquisition of the aircraft 
carrier from France, would not have occurred. 
The second key fact centers around the Brazilian 
Defense Ministry.  The desire to create the Defense 
Ministry, largely opposed by the military, drove the 
Cardoso administration to increase military funding in 
order to pacify negative sentiment towards the Ministry’s 
creation.  For its capitulation and rescinding of its 
ministerial status, the military was rewarded with higher 
salaries and greatly increased budgets at the expense of 
its prerogative to self-determination.  This, coupled with 
the reality of the SIVAM project, worked to give the Navy 
the largest funding boon it had seen in many years.  By the 
beginning of the new century, Brazil had replaced its aging 
carrier, given it aircraft, and begun looking into other 
programs including the long-desired nuclear submarine, 
which are still high on the Navy’s list of priorities 
today. 
E. INSTITUTIONAL EMULATION: THE OTHER DOMESTIC ANGLE 
There is another perspective worth noting, that may 
have contributed to Brazil’s drive to achieve a blue water 
naval force.  Many emerging democracies or Third World 
states, beleaguered with the prospect of institutionalizing 
and consolidating democracy within their borders, often 
ultimately emulate the institutions of established states.  
While this perspective has often been relegated to 
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explaining why a given state’s government will take shape 
similarly to an existing one in another, it can also be 
used to explain why a state will drive itself to 
maintaining armed forces that it may or may not need, or 
that is largely symbolic in nature.  This is arguably the 
case in Brazil, where the existence of an aircraft carrier 
is often thought of as unusual.   
Institutional emulation is most prevalent in Europe, 
where following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
states that emerged in Central and Eastern Europe were 
democratizing and in need of a successful solution to 
quickly consolidate their regimes.  The process, while 
internationally aimed, is solely domestic in focus and 
scope.  A good idea of how institutional emulation tends to 
happen is presented by political scientist James Sperling: 
The deep structure of the international 
system...requires states to be functionally alike 
– alike in the capacities that they pursue.  This 
requirement suggests that states will converge on 
a narrow range of successful institutional forms 
in the management of those policy areas that 
directly contribute to national autonomy or 
survival.82 
Essentially, it seems to work almost as a “bandwagon” 
– a state will choose to emulate the institutions of 
another successful state because all of the others around 
it are either doing the same, or have already done so.  In 
this manner, the emulating state maximizes its “prospect 
for survival and prosperity.” 
While this may be enough to explain why a state would 
choose to simply emulate another’s institutions, some 
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additional conditions should be noted. A caveat to this 
institutionalist approach is that 
The social world is a cultural system, structured 
by an evolving set of categorical prescriptions 
and proscriptions that define and delimit 
appropriate action...since these cultural 
categories are practically taken for granted as 
lawful, actors rarely subject conforming 
behaviors to cost-benefit analysis – or do so 
only ritualistically.83 
Essentially, then, in additional to the requirements 
already stated, a state embarking on an emulation of 
another’s institution do so with little regard for the 
ultimate consequences, mainly because it is generally 
assumed that it is the right thing to do. 
To apply the institutional emulation theory to 
Brazil’s Navy, what emerges is an interesting situation.  
The Brazilian fleet is comprised mainly of ships acquired 
from either the Unites States or Western European nations.  
Little of the fleet was constructed in Brazil itself, nor 
are the majority of units in service Brazilian in design.  
The sailors, in particular the officers, wear uniforms 
modeled after Western navies, and are educated in tactics 
and procedures similar to those practiced in Western 
navies.  While this alone does not suggest outright 
emulation, it does provide some evidence that the Brazilian 
Navy is not a force created solely on its own without 
influence from other navies.   
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Where some sentiment in favor of the Navy is strongest 
lies in the civilian population of Brazil.  In general, 
most in Brazil view the Navy and its strength as extremely 
important.  Some of the best examples of these opinions can 
be found in commentaries and editorials from some of the 
more popular publications in Brazil.  One such article 
submitted to Sao Paulo Folha de Sao Paulo illustrates this 
with respect to Brazil’s naval aviation: 
The fact is that country stops being “peripheral” 
only when it is respected.  And Brazil will be 
respected only if it has the conditions and 
competence necessary for making its decisions at 
the international level.  Without naval aviation, 
there is no way to defend a fleet.  Furthermore, 
any fleet without it is no more than a coastal 
navigation fleet.  With the Minas Gerais and Sao 
Paulo, Brazil is improving its conditions for 
implementing a national plan in which the 
country’s sovereignty will ensure the dignity of 
its people.84 
The commentator here clearly likens the possession of 
aircraft carriers to the ability of Brazil to gain respect 
and preserve its sovereignty.  The nuclear submarine 
program also attracts attention from civilian commentators 
in Brazil: 
In the 21st Century, Brazil will have to develop a 
military capability compatible with is 
giganticness and its real geopolitical size, 
without identifying enemies...The country will 
need an ocean-going Navy, an Air Force with the 
capability for prompt response, and an Army with 
expeditionary capability.85 
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This is yet another piece of evidence that Brazilians 
in general are in support of creating a strong military in 
general.  Countless published examples similar to these are 
readily found on the Internet, and other various reliable 
sources such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
Clearly, Brazilian civilians do not wish to be regarded as 
a Third World nation, and as a result are willing to 
support such things as the Navy’s expansion into blue 
water. 
The most important factor, however, lending to the 
idea that Brazil is emulating the navies of Western nations 
again comes back to the pride of their fleet, the aircraft 
carrier Sao Paulo.  Brazil, as mentioned before, sees 
itself as an emerging regional power and perhaps later 
becoming the hegemon of South America.  In keeping with 
this role, Brazil is determined to maintain the carrier, 
much as the United States in its role as a hegemon 
maintains its own fleet of carriers.  It has been argued 
about the acquisition and maintenance of weapons such as 
the aircraft carrier that 
The armed forces, equipped with as modern weapons 
as possible, came to be regarded by many 
governments in the Third World as a symbol of 
unity and independence and as tangible evidence 
that the government intended to defend its 
sovereignty.  The actual utility of these 
weapons...was often of secondary importance.86 
Thus, perhaps Brazil truly does not know the role its 
aircraft carrier will play, other than to ensure that its 
own perceived sovereignty remains intact.  Regardless, it 
is obvious that Brazil has sought to emulate the navies of 
Western powers, both in attempt to establish itself as a 
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regional power, as well as proving that it cares about its 
own sovereignty and prestige. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Much has been presented here about Brazilian domestic 
politics and its Navy, and how they tend to affect each 
other.  The general trend in Brazilian domestic politics 
seems to increasingly support a more regionally dominant 
role for the country, and in this role, the Navy will 
always have a place.  The creation of the Ministry of 
Defense, the completion and early successes of the SIVAM 
program, and the recent naval modernization and procurement 
programs all contribute to this assumption.  Brazil’s Navy 
has obviously benefited from the Cardoso administration’s 
favorable fiscal treatment of the armed forces during his 
administration.  The current Lula administration, while 
having lowered defense budgets somewhat, has not shown it 
wishes to reduce the fleet. 
The institutional emulation theory provides an 
interesting and different perspective in explaining why, 
domestically, Brazil has chosen to pursue the maintenance 
of a blue-water navy, when in reality it faces little 
external threat, and most certainly has little need for a 
new aircraft carrier.  The only explanation remaining in 
this regard is that Brazil’s Navy has done what it has done 
because it wishes to try to maintain itself as capable of 
defending its sovereignty.  Additionally, it also wishes to 
prove that it can maintain its role as a regional power.  
The best course of action for Brazil’s Navy, then, was to 
do its best to be like and act like the navies of the most 
influential Western powers, namely the United States Great  
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Britain, and France, all of whom have aircraft carriers and 


















Brazil has clearly demonstrated a desire to become a 
player on the world stage in recent years.  Strangely 
enough, it essentially can already be considered a regional 
power in South America, as its economy is among the 
strongest.  With respect to its Navy, Brazil has the sole 
aircraft carrier on the continent, Argentina having 
discarded its elderly carrier in December 1996 after years 
of inactivity.87  Brazil is clearly the dominant naval power 
in South America simply for the existence of its aircraft 
carrier, the other newly acquired units and the nuclear 
submarine program notwithstanding. The three different 
perspectives given in this paper provide a glimpse into the 
mindset behind Brazil’s desire to maintain a relatively 
strong (and expensive) naval force, and why it seems a 
small part of the big picture of Brazil attaining a more 
influential role in the world.    
The power and prestige argument is relevant, as it 
helps to explain Brazil’s situation in a more historical 
sense.  Mearsheimer’s concept of offensive realism is most 
certainly applicable to this case, as in striving for the 
more far-reaching naval force Brazil is asserting its 
relative superiority over the other South American 
countries.  Few if any of the remainder of South American 
countries have the financial means, much less the political 
will to maintain a fleet that includes a maintenance-
intensive aircraft carrier in its inventory.  As the 
aircraft carrier is generally considered the modern capital 
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ship, as the battleship once was, possessing one grants a 
country a certain prestige, regardless of the mission for 
which it is intended.  Perhaps this explains why in 
additions to Brazil, Russia continues to maintain its sole 
carrier, and India is trying to replace its aged one.   
The desire of Brazil to gain a permanent seat on an 
expanded United Nations Security Council has been long-
standing within the country, and thus Brazil has been 
willing to take the steps it deemed necessary to attain 
that goal.  As recently as March 2005, UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan finally proposed sweeping changed to the UN 
Security Council, after years of consideration.88  As of 
this writing, the ultimate results of that proposal have 
yet to be seen, but it is highly likely that some reforms 
are inevitable.  In becoming more involved in the United 
Nations, notably by taking a lead role in the most recent 
UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Brazil is 
almost certainly attempting to demonstrate its resolve to 
be a member of the Security Council.  The Brazilian Navy 
fits into this equation because by creating a more blue-
water force as it seems to be doing, the Navy will be able 
to better support overseas roles such as the one in Haiti.  
All but one (China) of the current UN permanent Security 
Council members possesses at least one aircraft carrier in 
their inventory, and all have been active in peacekeeping 
missions.  Brazil obviously sees its Navy as a prerequisite 
for greater UN involvement; thus the recent expansion and 
drive toward “open water.” 
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Domestically, within Brazil one of the most important 
events to happen to the Navy was the creation of the 
Defense Ministry.  Since prior to that, each service was 
essentially “master of its own destiny,” there was no 
oversight and consequently, stagnant change and innovation.  
Now, with a Ministry of Defense in place and capable of 
conducting thorough defense reviews much like the United 
States Quadrennial Defense Review, the Brazilian Navy can 
be better provided with guidance on where to devote its 
energies.  The SIVAM project, expensive though it was, 
arguably assisted in acquiring the new aircraft carrier and 
other units during the program’s gestation period.  The 
fact that the program was mostly concerned with the 
Brazilian Army and Air Force leads to the conclusion that 
the Navy was given extra funding to acquire the new units 
and start the new acquisition programs. 
Taken separately, each of these perspectives are 
relevant explanations for why Brazil has chosen to pursue 
its current fleet.  However, together, the total argument 
is even more convincing.  While Brazil’s desire to gain a 
seat on the UN Security Council is nothing new, the funding 
provided to the Navy as a result of domestic issues such as 
the SIVAM program most certainly contributed to Brazil 
finding the best way to better itself in the eyes of the 
UN.  Thus, the Navy was seen as the “best investment” of 
these energies, and was developed to the state it is in 
today as a result of both factors.  Gaining more naval 
power, especially the aircraft carrier, also increases 
Brazil’s prestige factor.     
Regardless of the ultimate outcome, Brazil has chosen 
to be a blue-water naval power, albeit a modest one.  If 
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the proposed nuclear submarine program goes through as 
planned, Brazil will be one of only a few countries capable 
of constructing such units anywhere in the world.  Brazil’s 
new carrier is probably good for another twenty years of 
service, given the length of time its predecessor served in 
the Brazilian Navy.  Thus, barring any unforeseen 
circumstances, the next decade will likely result in a 
Brazil sitting on a newly reformed United Nations Security 
Council, a Brazilian Navy more active away from the South 
American coastline, and a greater acceptance of Brazil as a 
regional power in the Southern Hemisphere. 
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